Strategies of likeness : M.F.A. University of Tasmania, 1988-89 by Barratt, Phillip J
PHILLIP J. BARRATT 
STRATEGIES OF LIKENESS - 
(TWO VOLUMES) 
M.F.A. UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA 
1988 - 89 
STRATEGIES OF LIKENESS 
VOLUME 1 
Presented in this book is documentation of the work produced during 1986-89 
within the Masters of Fine Arts course at the Tasmanian School of Art, 
University of Tasmania. 
Name: Phillip J. Barratt 
Date: November 1989 
Book No.: 
Volume 1 
Contents 
Volume 1. 	Theoretical Submissions 
Seminar Paper 1 
Seminar Paper 2 
I 
(Volume 2). 
Section 	i 	Course Proposal 
, 
ii 	Amendment 
iii 	Documentation of work 
iv 	Work Processes 
Strategies of Likeness 
©Phil Barrett 1989 
Introduction 
Contained within this volume are Papers One and Two. Both use as 
a central structure a quotation from Roland Barthes' book Camera Lucida 
- Reflections on Photography. 
The portrait-photograph is a closed field of forces. Four image 
repertoires intersect here, oppose and distort each other. In front 
of the lens, I am at the same time: 
the one I think I am 
the one I want others to think I am 
the one the photographer thinks I am 
and the one he makes use of to exhibit his art.' 
What the quotation really identifies, is the nature and the deduction 
of human behaviour that is a determining factor in any portrait process, 
whether it is photographic, painted or filmic. 
Paper One, therefore establishes the process where, as a witness to 
someone's behaviour, we arrive at a deduction that assesses who and 
what they are - their personality. 
By appropriating Barthes' quotation, four major areas are investigated: 
1) the 'self we think we are 
2) the 'self we present to others 
3) the 'self interpreted by others (society) 
4) the 'self that is physiognomically determined. 
By expanding the concerns of Paper One, the second paper 
examines photographic portraiture and those artists who continue to 
believe they can reveal the soul - the personality of the sitter. 
Barthes, R Camera Lucida, Reflections on Photography (translated by Richard 
Howard) Fontana Paperbacks, London 1984; 13. 
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STRATEGIES OF LIKENESS 
Paper One 
Roland Barthes' article "Photography and Electoral Appeal" in 
Mythologies prepares the way for this enquiry. In this essay Barthes 
analyses the politician's electoral campaign, that uses the photographic 
portrait. 
The effigy [Barthes says] establishes a personal link between the politician and 
the voters; the candidate does not only offer a programme for judgement, he 
suggests a physical climate, a set of daily choices expressed in a morphology, a 
way of dressing, a posture... 
What is transmitted through the photograph of the candidate is not his plans, but 
his deep motives, all his family, mental, even erotic circumstances, all his style 
of life of which he is at once the product, the example and the bait. 2 
Barthes is suggesting that the political portrait becomes an anti-
intellectual device where the photograph is beyond policies and speeches 
and through the 'look', the face can epitomise the very essence of the 
man. Barthes therefore addresses the concept that, the psychic depth of a 
person - their persona - can be made up entirely of surfaces. This pre-
supposes a number of important conditions. 
One, that there exists a system of non-verbal communication, where 
gesture, posture, facial expression, costume and physiognomy indicate 
thoughts, feelings and personalities; that is, the outward physical sign-
codes are manifestations of inner physical or psychological states. 
Two, that display characteristics are in the main truthful, - where 
gesture, costume and personality are not an act or performance for pre-
determined effect and the expressive entities have an isomorphic relation 
to something going on within the subject and the observer is sensitive to 
Barthes, R Mythologies (selected and translated by Annettte Lavers), Jonathan 
Cape 1972; 91. 
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and relates to the 'presumed' inner state of the subject. It becomes 
obvious this proposal assumes there is an exact correspondence between 
the expressive behaviour of the subject and their inner state and the 
interpretation put on it by the observer. 
Research into this area by biologists, sociologists and psychologists 
has been extensive, but so variable has the response been to the 
interpretation of visual information that much investigation has become 
involved in the perceptual problem of the accuracy and reliability of the 
judgement.3 
An alternative model was proposed. What is enacted is a 
presentation. The behaviour is presented to be seen and to have a 
predetermined effect on the observer, whether conscious or unconscious. 
That is, there exists a tenuous link between the inner state and the 
perceived state. 
Surely this is the implication of the photographic campaign image 
identified by Barthes, where there exists a possible dislocation between 
the projected image and the actual personality of the politician. In other 
words, the photograph is a carefully orchestrated 'drama', replete with 
signs, that has little basis in fact. 
The significance of this forces us to investigate whether the 
'persona' - the identity shown or expressed, is any indication of the 'real' 
person when there is evidence enough to suggest people display not one 
identity but many identities. 
As an example, consider the different clothing styles in our own 
wardrobes - each designed for a particular look or occasion that is far 
removed from any practical function of warmth; for we put on more than 
just body adornment; we become and are seen as representative of the 
3 	Spiegel, J. and Machotka, M. Messages of the Body The Free Press, 1974; 6. 
4 
clothes we wear, that 'may' place us both socially, economically and 
culturally. 
So what is personality then? 
None of us would deny the existence of personality. Our daily 
functioning in society requires the ability to establish criteria for 
judgement, and yet in trying to specify in some precise objective way the 
nature of personality, the identification becomes vague and ill-defined. 
An example of this can be seen in the Funk and Wagnall Dictionary: 
Personality: "the collective attributes and qualities which characterise 
a person as distinguished from impersonal existence.The sum total of 
traits necessary to describe what it is to be a person." 
In any estimation of the word, this definition is severely limited and 
rather vague. For this reason, I sought a more definitive explanation. 
The word 'personality' is derived from the Latin persona. 
Originally this denoted the masks worn by theatrical players in ancient 
Greek dramas and was eventually to encompass the actors' role as well. 
Therefore, the initial conception of 'personality' was that of the superficial 
social image adopted by the individual in playing life-roles - a public 
personality that we display to those around us. This view is consistent 
with that of the contemporary interpretation that equates personality with 
charm, poise, popularity, physical attractiveness, and a host of other 
socially desirable characteristics. We hear in everyday language such 
comments as, 'he has a terrific personality' or 'she has a lot of 
personality'. 
Within the field of psychology the definition of personality remains 
vague. There is sufficient disagreement about the meaning that Larry H. 
Hjelle and Daniel J. Zeigler - say: 
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There may be as many different meanings of the term 'personality' as there are 
psychologists who have tried to define it. 4 
For the purposes of this paper a more definitive analysis is not possible. 
However, I feel S.R.Maddi offers a concise and useful introduction: 
Personality is a stable set of characteristics and tendencies that determine those 
commonalities and differences in the psychological behaviour, thoughts, feelings 
and actions of people that have a continuity in time and that may or may not be 
easily understood in terms of the social or biological pressures of the immediate 
situation alone. 5 
To this analysis, I propose that any personality theory must necessarily 
allow for the four concepts of the self: 
1) the concept of 'self - what the individual believes their personality to be. 
2) the personality we choose to exhibit to others. 
3) the personality that is interpreted by others - which in turn is dictated by the 
observer's personality, race, culture, age and even the idiosyncratic feelings of the 
observer's observation on the day. 
. 4) the personality that is physiognomically determined. 
What is to be established is whether there is any perceivable 
relationship between the inner state of the individual, the character or 
personality that is projected, and the interpretation put on it by the 
observer. 
Society I believe, requires or maintains a perceivable link between 
these possible personality distortions, as the concept of the 'split 
personality' is something we may be able to grasp intellectually, but rarely 
is it conceivable emotionally. 
4 	 Hjelle, L. A. and Ziegler D. I. Personality Theories, 
Basic Assumptions and Applications McGraw Hill Book Company 1981; 6. 
5 	Maddi S. R. Personality Theories - Comparative Analysis Dorsey Press, 
1976. 
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Concept 1 - The Self. 
The concept of the self is vague, but most of us have some definite 
notion of who or what we are. 
Katin and McPortland, in 1954, found the concept of the self first 
addressed the defined roles through which the individuals saw themselves 
i.e. female, Catholic, black etc. followed by the character traits of 
generous, friendly, humorous and so on. 6 
The concept of the 'self, addressed scientifically, becomes difficult. 
However, an overview of the writings of Sigmund Freud, Charles Cooley 
and George Herbert Mead, offer an introduction to the concept of self 
with the emphasis that the self is learned through social interaction. 
Freud's Theory (1856-1939) 
Freud's major contribution to personality theory was that the 
motives for much of human behaviour are unconscious; that we are often 
unaware of the real reasons for our actions. He argued that early 
childhood experiences are often lost in memory but can often have a 
significant effect on the development of personality. 
Freud believed that the individual is born in an essential conflict with 
society and that it is in society's interest to suppress and direct these 
conflicts with particular attention to the basic drives of sex and 
aggression. 
Personality, Freud saw, could be divided into three basic interacting parts: 
The id is the reservoir of drives present in the individual at birth and throughout 
life; it is entirely unconscious and demands continual and instantaneous 
satisfaction. Because the id, particularly in the child, cannot be always satisfied 
6 	Krech D, Crutchfield, R.S, Livison, N Elements of Psychology 2nd ed. 1969; 
797 
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and must often be repressed, there emerges the ego, the conscious part of the self 
that rationally tries to balance the demands of the social environment and the 
urges of the id.7 
The social demands on an individual establish a super ego, where the 
influence comes particularly from the parents, which in the individual 
becomes roughly equivalent to a person's conscience. 
Cooley's Theory (1864 - 1929). 
The central concept of Cooley's theory is that society is the 'looking 
glass'; the mirror in which we can observe the reactions of others to our 
behaviour. The concept of self, 'who we are', is derived from this 
reflection. 
It is only seeing the attitudes of others that we can learn whether we 
are attractive or ugly, popular or unpopular, respectable or disreputable. 
By observing the response of others - or by imagining what their response 
would be like to some behaviour we are contemplating - we are able to 
evaluate ourselves and our actions. If the image we see or imagine in the 
social mirror is favourable, our self-concept is enhanced and our 
behaviour is likely to be repeated. If the image is unfavourable, our self-
concept is diminished and our behaviour is likely to change. 8 
There is the possibility of a misinterpretation, a mis-reading in the 
reactions of others and, as has been pointed, 'out whether our reading in 
the looking glass is accurate or not, it is through this interpretation that we 
Robertson. I Sociology second edition, Worth Pub., 1977; 112. 
8 	Ibid.; 13. 
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learn our identity: there is no self without society, no '1' without a 
corresponding 'they' to provide our self-image:9 
Like Freud, Cooley believed the concept of the self was formed 
early in childhood and remains more stable and lasting than those 
influences later on in life. 
Mead's Theory (1863 - 1931) 
George Herbert Mead (1934) elaborated Cooley's theory by 
introducing the concept of symbolic interaction, the interaction between 
people that takes place through symbols such as gestures, facial 
expressions, and above all, language. Language is socially learned and is 
essential for all but the most simple forms of thoughts. In this, the mind - 
through which we interpret our own behaviour and that of others - is a 
social product. 
Mead pointed out that a vital outcome of socialisation is the ability to anticipate 
what others expect of us and to shape our behaviour accordingly. This capacity 
is achieved by role taking - pretending to take, or actually taking, the roles of 
other people, so that one can see oneself from this viewpoint. In early childhood 
children are able to internalise the expectations only of the particular other, that 
is, specific other people such as parents. But as they grow older they learn to 
internalise the expectations of the generalised other, the attitudes and viewpoint 
of society as a whole. This internalised general concept of social expectations 
provides the basis for self evaluation and hence form self concept. 10 
Mead pointed out that socialisation is never perfect or complete. There 
remains in man two entities - the T which is the spontaneous, 
Ibid.; 114. 
10 	Ibid.; 115. 
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unsocialised self and the 'me' which is conscious of the norms and 
expectations of society. 
Unlike Freud, who believed man was essentially in conflict with 
society, Mead maintained there were times in any person's life where the 
socialised 'me' was not always in control of the 'I'. 
It could be concluded that the concept of the self as pointed out by 
Freud, Mead and Cooley, is basically seen as a social product that is 
modified through extensive interaction with other people. The socialised 
self is within the boundaries of hereditary possibilities, dependent on the 
family as the most significant single contributing factor where the school 
and the peer group are additional, powerful reinforcing agents. There 
does however remain a further agency which is gaining attention as a 
significant factor in the development of the self - the media. 
The Mass Media - Advertising and Identity. 
The impact the mass media has on the individual society is hard to judge. 
To find that 95% of homes in Australia have a television set and the 
average Australian between the ages of three and sixteen spends more time 
in front of the television than in the classroom, the impact must be 
considerable on the individual. 
John Berger in Ways of Seeing believes that so significant is 
advertising in the formation of an identity that no longer does the audience 
merely identify with the stereotypical depiction of the advertisement, but 
the advertisement actually begins to prescribe the identity. For Western 
women, Berger says, 'the publicity image steals her love of herself as she 
is and offers it back to her for the price of the product.' 11 : 
1 1 	Berger, J. Ways of Seeing l British Broadcasting Corporation and Penguin 
Books; 134. 
10 
Rosalind Coward in Female Desire - Womens' Sexuality Today, supports 
Berger's claim. Coward believes the exploitative potential of the 
advertising medium has actually created a number of psychological 
conditions in the woman that is tangled up in the narcissistic construction 
of the woman as an object of the look. 
Advertising images don't initiate a happy state of narcissism for the woman, but 
one of discontent.I 2 
Judith Williamson in Decoding Advertisements suggests that not only do 
advertisements aim to persuade large numbers of people to buy a product, 
but they also tell you what you are like and who you are. The 
advertisement addresses you personally and intimately and by creating a 
window into the world, it creates a space out in front of itself into which 
the reader can step. 
You move into the space as you look into the ad and in doing so 'become' the 
spectator, you feel the 'hey you' really did apply to you in particularI 3 
That is, you deny or exchange your own self for the person who is 
addressed in the advertisement. Williamson argues, they tell you what 
you are like and who you are. 
Hence the Coca-Cola commercials tell you you, are someone who drinks Coke. 
You don't drink to become someone, you drink Coke because you already are 
that person. But it is the advertisement that has constructed you as that 
identity.I 4 
John Bryden Brown in Ads that Made Australia provides the remark 
12 	Coward , R. Female Desire - Women's Sexuality Today London Granada, 
1984; 79. 
13 	Williamson, J. Decoding Advertisements, Ideology and meaning in advertising 
Marion Boyers, London, 1978. 
14 	ibid. 
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Coca-Cola has consistently presented itself as a way of life based on fun and 
pleasure. So successful was this advertising that teenagers since the 1950's 
weren't part of their own way of life if they didn't drink Coke. 15 
As persuasive as these observations are, it is hard to believe that 
advertising has reached such ideological powers in the construction of a 
personality or identity, when obviously we don't all drink Coca Cola or 
buy the multitude of products advertised everyday. However if there is 
something in what John Bryden Brown has said, maybe 'we' no longer 
buy Coca-Cola but have appropriated the image and left the product 
behind. 
The millions of dollars spent not only on the making of 
advertisements but the motivational research, through the sciences of 
sociology and psychology, must contribute to the development of 
personality. We are all to some degree, a product of advertising's 
success, though some aspects of its internalization are more overt than 
others. I close this enquiry through the example of the expanding 
participation and interest in aerobics. 
The success of the aerobics formula in monetary terms is in the 
billions. The more extraordinary thing is where Coca-Cola, once alluded 
to life style; aerobics has manufactured a total package that tells you how 
to live, both bodily and spiritually. It tells you what to eat, how to dress 
both during and after exercise. It even suggests possible holiday 
destinations; holiday packages for those who want to continue to 'work 
out', ie. ski holidays, health clubs and holidays by the beach and exhibit 
the vital body, to participate in the vigorous health. 
Aerobics has created a self perpetuating and immensely profitable 
consumer industry that predominantly plays on the constructed vanity of 
15 	Brown J.B. Ads That Made Australia Double Bay, Sydney, 1981; 83. 
the affluent Western female. With a society very conscious of 'how one 
looks', aerobics has created its own prophets who become a walking, 
talking advertisement of 'its success'. It is a cult image and whilst we are 
not all fanatics, we cannot help but to become influenced by its overt 
message - look young and be happy. 
Concept 2 - The 'Self you Present to Others 
Whatever you consider your 'true' self to be, you cannot deny that 
the self you present to others varies from one situation to another. The 
nature of society requires that we present different aspects of ourselves in 
different situations. 
If everyone behaved in exactly the same way to everyone else, social 
chaos would result. We would be unable to fulfil our various roles as 
teachers, students, sons, daughters, employers, workers and so on.I 6 
This does not mean we are habitually insincere. Insincerity arises only 
when we present a self in which we do not believe. But so familiar do the 
roles become, we are usually not even aware we are playing them. It is 
merely a part of an everyday routine. However, only when we go to a job 
interview or are introduced to a stranger do we become more conscious of 
our actions and the impressions we try to make. The job interview is a 
time when people are totally conscious of what they say, how they say it, 
how they act and the clothes they wear. 
The critical role of first impressions supports this point. There is 
ample evidence to show that first impressions can be sufficiently powerful 
as to dominate all future perceptions.I 7 
16 	op.cit. Sociology ; 135. 
17 	Kretch D., Crutchfield R. S., Livson N. Elements of Psychology 1969; 749. 
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Erving Goffman (1959) extends the well-known principles of first 
• impressions when he takes the concept of 'acting' a role seriously. 
Loosely based on the claim that all the world's a stage, he applies a 
'dramaturgical approach' to social interaction, studying it as though we 
are all actors in a theatre, playing various parts and scenes. People, 
Goffman argues, are deeply concerned with impression management. The 
scenery on the 'set' may perhaps extend to the posters on the wall, or a 
lavishly illustrated book on the coffee table. Personal 'props' like the pipe 
or the briefcase, or a particular college insignia on a tie, add to a wardrobe 
of effects. People are careful to wear appropriate clothing for the 
occasion, presenting a different self by dressing fashionably to go to a 
party or more formally for a job interview. 
Goffman further suggests, we have a 'front' stage and a back stage 
for our performances. The role we exhibit as a school teacher in front of 
the class is different from the role we have among fellow teachers in the 
staff room. 
Impression management in the way that Goffman indicates, must 
remain credible only when the performance is well practised and 
rehearsed. But there are times when the audience becomes aware of the 
impression the actor 'gives' deliberately and the impression 'they' give off 
without intending it. 
Umberto Eco's article "Strategies of Lying" documents wellpne 
such incident. 
In a scandal that was to become known as Watergate, Eco investigates 
President Nixon's televised speech on the 30th April 1973. The speech 
sought to quell the rising suspicion generated by the press, who at this 
time, had no specific proof of its allegations. 
Eco cites Nixon's speech as an undeniable masterpiece in rhetoric and 
concludes: 
14 
The narrative construction would have been perfect had the discourse been a 
written text. But it was "spoken". And every muscle of Nixon's face betrayed 
embarrassment, fear, and tension. Nixon's speech was the visual representation 
of insecurity, acted out by the guarantor of security. It was this fear that the 
Americans perceived on their television screens. 
What happened? Before the televised speech a small percentage of 
Americans distrusted Nixon, yet after it the figure increased enormously, and 
exceeded fifty percent. 18 
To conclude, briefly, Concept 2 - the Self You Present to Others, Figure 
1 is a useful example. 
Fig. 1. 
18 	Eco, U. Strategies of lying (edited by Blinsky Marshall). 
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An Englishman with a bowler hat, a three piece suit and an umbrella 
describes his probable social status, probable education, probable voting 
preferences and possible personality. 
As this suggests, it is not with complete certainty that we can ascribe 
all the attributes from the clues available. However, whether the 
summation about his personality is correct or not, the image stereotype is 
sufficiently powerful to embed this man in a total picture that talks of the 
utterly conservative English middle-class man. 
The interpretation of the image stereotype and the accuracy of the 
interpretation introduces our third concept - the personality that society 
will construct from persona clues. 
Concept 3 Social Perception 
In forming an impression of someone, we more or less consciously take 
note of their physical appearance, their actions, voice, expression and 
other clues that may be psychologically meaningful. From the evidence in 
front of us, we formulate a fairly detailed concept of their personality - 
what they are like, their thoughts, feelings and needs. 
Kretch, Crutchfield and Livson in Elements of Psychology, suggest 
that from what might appear diverse and unrelated impressions, the 
observer has a strong tendency to form a coherent identity of another 
person based on inadequate and incomplete data. 
To cite the reasons why we do this could suggest the notion that our 
daily existence requires an over-all impression of someone that permits us 
to interpret and predict their actions, or it might simply be to organise and 
categorise the unknown and therefore make life more predictable. The 
reasons why we do this are not particularly important but it is significant 
16 
that from a few clues there is a strong tendency for the perceiver to invent 
attributes that serve to fill in the gaps in what they see and hear. 
The ability and, it seems, need to construct a 'personality type', can be 
shown from this abstract example. 
S.E.Ash at Brooklyn College, 1946, found from the seven words, 
ironical, inquisitive, persuasive, ener0tic, assured, talkative and cold, 
that students could write down a full bodied impression of an unknown 
person, even to the extent the students filled out the picture describing the 
person to have a sense of humour. 19 
For the purposes of this paper, this example may be a little obscure but it 
does support the significant claim that identity or personality is based on a 
lack of information where the skeleton must be fleshed out from a 
person's own implicit theory of someone else. 
If we rely on an implied theory in constructing a personality type, 
there must exist the potential for an inaccurate deduction of someone's 
personality. The deduction relies firstly,on the assumption that 
personality-character type, is not an 'act' fabricated for the occasion. 
Secondly, the spectator must be well-acquainted with both the verbal and 
non-verbal language-codes of the behaviour. Thirdly, we must be aware 
that our own idiosyncratic feelings or thoughts (even on the day), or our 
cultural bias that can mis-interpret or re-interpret the available information. 
The second and third points can be briefly expressed through an 
example of a cultural difference in an awareness of personal space. 
On meeting an Arab the experience is that they speak considerably louder 
and more aggressively than the average Australian. Not only do they 
speak louder, but they stand very much closer when in conversation. 
19 	op. cit. Elements of Psychology ; 797. 
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By appearing to violate one's 'personal space', the Australian will 
probably feel uncomfortable and ill at ease. The simple and uninformed 
deduction of this experience could find Arabs to be generally 
loud,overbearing and rude. Smell and spittle, can contribute further 
attributes that quite mistakenly, can get in the way of the other personal 
qualities of these people. 
The authors of Elements of Psychology do not address the 
misinterpretation of available personality clues other than to say 
Provided people generally share the same general culture, our implied theory will 
tend to portray the personality of those around us. However, when confronted 
with persons who are not of our own immediate group or culture, the customary 
notions of what goes with what are not applicable. Under these circumstances, 
we fall back on a set of stereotypes. 2° 
Stereotypes 
Clearly it could be seen the identification with the stereotype permits 
society an economy of effort in scrutinising the 'persona'. All forms of 
classification by which we quickly summarise the social information of 
human encounters we assume is to render social life predictable, or at least 
less chaotic. Social types are theoretically subject to correction and 
individualisation as we get to know individuals through direct contact. But 
here we meet some differences between stereotyping and other forms of 
social typing. Everyday typing characteristically grows out of an 
interaction with individuals,whereas stereotypes, particularly racial 
stereotypes (that may have historically preceded these individuals) is often 
the function of a physical or social distance between them and ourselves. 
Consequently, we may simply never get close enough to the people we 
20 	Ibid.; 801. 
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stereotype, to correct or modify the original typification. In other words, 
as long as we fail to perceive the true characteristics of the person and in 
some way distort or eliminate evidence that would challenge our 
stereotype image - there is no need to modify our judgement. 
And yet, so powerful is the stereotypical image and cultural maintenance 
in its construction and perpetuation, that the prejudices and typification are 
enormously difficult to break down. This point is reinforced by Ian 
Robertson's book Sociology. As he says: 
Should a prejudiced person find that an individual member of a group does not 
conform to the stereotype for the group, this evidence is simply taken as the 
exception that proves the rule and not as grounds for questioning the original 
belief.21 
There does however remain another side of the stereotypical coin. People 
sufficiently internalize the expectation or role of the stereotype, they 
appear to become the 'pure' example of it. There are sayings such as "he 
is so much like the typical 'cop' or 'Italian', it simply can't be true." 
All I can say of the 'cop', is that given the conditioning process of 
the academy, the role is so internalized, that the police cannot help but be 
partly a product of the institution that formed them. This may provoke the 
saying and feeling, "once a cop, always a cop." 
The point that must be emphasised is that the stereotype is only in 
part based on fact, the remainder relies on conjecture and speculation. 
However, the power of the stereotype should never be underestimated as 
the stereotypical image can live independently of the victim, as in the case 
of racism. In other words, what is seen is what the spectator wants to see 
and the prejudices or stereotypes deny the evidence that is there in front of 
them. 
21 	op. cit. Sociology ; 44. 
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The importance of clothes is the final point upon which I conclude 
this section on stereotype.I think you will generally agree that by selecting 
a particular jacket, dress or jeans, people begin to make quite specific 
statements about themselves. They declare themselves as individuals but 
they simultaneously indicate the extent to which they belong with other 
sets of individuals. Everyday clothes are in a very real sense distinctive 
uniforms conveying to other people important messages about the identity 
of the wearer. 
As an aside to this and without wanting to attempt an answer, I 
propose the question: Are you the same person dressed in different 
clothes and therefore projecting a different image, or, is the projected 
image in fact modified by the clothes chosen for the occasion eg. the 
wedding dress the ball gown, the suit and tie? 
The power of the institutional gown, whilst it does not relate to the 
question asked, is an interesting example that shows the extent to which 
clothes obscure or appear to deny the individual. 
In 1988 the Family Law Court in Tasmania decided to revert from 
civilian clothes to the formal wig and gown whose origin dates back to the 
seventeenth or eighteenth century. Why? 
Because it has been found that the number of reprisals on banisters 
and judges from irate divorce participants has been significantly reduced 
since the reintroduction of this archaic tradition. The wig and gown, it 
seems, sufficiently displace the particular identity of the barrister, as they 
are recontexualized as merely legal administrators in the institution of the 
law. 
Concept 4 Physiognomy 
20 
In the 1990's, the belief in the divination of character from bodily 
features (also known as somatomacy) as a significant factor in an 
assessment of personality, is a concept viewed not only with scepticism 
by many but with hostility, particularly by many social scientists, as is 
evident in the reading of Ian Robertson's Sociology. 
This is understandable in view of the charlatanism that has 
characterised the field and in view of the implication of hereditary 
determinism. 
My position is clear, as I believe the individual is born with a 
physical and hereditary potential which is developed within the 
possibilities of environmental and cultural factors. However, I cannot help 
but admit that physiognomy can be a determining factor in directing a 
personality deduction. 
John Casper Lavater in the 17th century was the first man to plead in 
the name of science the ability to read the personality in the face and figure 
of a man. 
21 
Fig.2. John Caspar Lavater by Thomas Holloway. 
Throughout his writing, his tone was defensive and pleading as he 
reiterated the claim that the inner state of man could be translated from his 
outer appearance on the basis of universal principles.' 
Nothing is more necessary, than to pay attention for a few days to what we hear, 
or read, respecting the human character, in order to collect Physiognomical 
decisions pronounced by the very Adversaries of the Science. "I read that in his 
eyes - It is sufficient to see him - He has the air of an honest man - I 
prognosticate good from that face"...I would trust him merely on his 
Physiognomy - If that man deceive me, I will trust nobody hereafter....Even 
Anti physiognomical decisions confirm, as exceptions, the universality of the 
sentiment from which I contend. "His physiognomy is against him - I could not 
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have suspected that from his look - He is better, or, he is worse than he appears 
etc.22 
Through the new technology of engraving Lavater illustrated his books 
with drawings from life and from old masters as exercises in 
physiognomical character analysis (see figure 3). 
Fig.3. Page from Lavater's Essays on Physiognomy  
In expressing his aims Lavater says: 
My chief aim is to encourage the Reader himself to engage in the career of 
observation - Let us begin only by collecting a sufficient number of 
observations, and endeavour to characterise them with all the precision, all the 
accuracy of which we are capable. 
The principal point in question is, to discover what is evidently 
determined in the features, and to fix the characteristic signs, the expression of 
which is generally acknowledged. 23 
22 	Polhemus, T. and Benthal, J. The Body as a Medium of Expression New York 
Dutton, 1975; 44. 
23 Ibid.; 45. 
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Lavater was sufficiently confident to believe in the analogy between 
physiognomy and language: 
I do not promise, for it would be the height of folly to make such a promise, to 
give entire the immense alphabet necessary to decipher the original language of 
nature, written on the face of man and on the whole of his exterior, but I flatter 
myself that I have been so happy as to trace a few of the characters of the divine 
alphabet, and that they will be so legible that a sound eye will readily 
distinguish them wherever they occur.24 
E. H. Gombrich - 'On Physiognomic Perception' - sees Lavater's method 
of physiognomic intuition as nonsense saying that Lavater 'explores his 
own response, but he treats it like an infallible oracle that is in no need of 
corroboration.'
As Gombrich implies and popular wisdom warns us; do not rely on 
first impressions and do not judge a book by its cover. 
Charles Darwin in Expression in Man and Animals, found physiognomic 
perception lacking. However, he felt that should humans by their 
disposition be generally sad or generally happy, these lines would become 
permanently etched into the face. 
Physiognomic perception, once advocated as a parlour game in the 
1700's, still has some currency today. It is no accident that advertising 
and movies use the faces they do, or even the voices dubbed in 
commercials and radios. 
The voice in itself can be particularly descriptive of a projected 
physiognomic type. It can be in utter disbelief that I hear and then see the 
same person; something like hearing a person on the radio and then 
24 	Spiegel John and Machotica Pavel Messages of the body The Free Press, 
1974; 10. 
25 	Gombrich E. H. Meditations on a Hobby Horse, and other essays on the 
theory of art London and New York, Phaidon, 1963; 49. 
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meeting them. An observation that in practice, can clearly deny any 
relationship between how one looks and speaks. Any dislocation between 
what we hear and then see, is usually amended as further evidence 
becomes available. 
As Gombrich suggests, it is in part through physiognomic 
perception that we anive at an hypothesis of deduction. But it is a system 
that must allow for modification and we destroy the value of that 
instrument if we overrate that initial groping, our first move in the effort to 
make sense.26 He goes on to say: 
The person with a gloomy face will alert us to the possibility of other gloomy 
symptoms; but as soon as his voice or his smile refute this expectation we 
forget or ignore our first impressions and adjust the category in which we place 
him.27 
CONCLUSION. 
We have seen through the four strategies of likeness that we are at 
the same time the one we think we are, the one we want others to think we 
are, the one society thinks we are and the one that time, context, race, sex, 
education and any number of other variables will ultimately determine. 
As could be envisaged, to reach any form of conclusion as to the 
relationship between these likenesses is immensely difficult. It can be seen 
however, that there exists, or can exist, a tenuous relationship between the 
inner self, the persona mask and the observer's perception. The persona 
is an immensely complicated system of relationships between the 
individual consciousness and society. Whilst the persona purports to be a 
mask, to carry out an assigned role or function, I think there is a point at 
26 	Ibid.; 50. 
27 	Ibid.; 50. 
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which the persona informs the inner self and is sufficiently internalised to 
become intractably part of the inner self. Both John Berger and Rosalind 
Coward write of this image dislocation, in particular for Western women, 
as generated by advertising. Similarly, Jung in Selected Writings, believes 
that the denial of the self through an appropriated image-persona is to a 
degree possible. However, he goes on to say: 
[The] soulessness of such an attitude is, however only apparent, for under no 
circumstances will the unconscious tolerate the shifting of gravity....When we 
examine such cases critically, we find that the excellence of the mask is 
compensated by the 'private life' going on behind it. 28 
'The socially strong man' is, in his private life often a mere child where 
his own states of feeling are concerned'. Whilst Jung identifies the 
persona mask as the single identity expressed in public, he neglects to 
mention the multiplicity of roles that we play in everyday life, roles that 
are in the main, sufficiently internalised that we are rarely aware of their 
occurrence, and the effect this has on the psyche. This invokes a further 
question - the concept of the 'split' personality. Whilst I am not 
proposing a 'split' personality as envisaged by Robert Louis Stephenson 
(Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde), I believe that there can exist a plurality of 
personalities in a single individual. One need only observe people closely 
as they move from one milieu to another to be aware of an alteration of 
personality. 
Two quite different environments may demand two totally different 
attitudes, one that may be in accordance with social conditions and 
requirements and the other in accordance with the domestic situation. It 
28 	Jung, C. Selected Writings (Selected and introduced by Anthony Storr), 
Fontana Press, 1983.; 95. 
26 
becomes immensely difficult, if not impossible, to assess which is the 
'true' character, or the 'real' personality. 
This brings us to the question of perception. Perception is largely a 
product of our own social, educational and cultural bias. As Robertson's 
book Sociology suggests, provided people generally share the same 
culture, the deduction of character/personality is generally correct. This 
observation is simplistic and, I believe, generally incorrect. The 
facade/persona offers little insight into the true character/characters of the 
personality. The neoplatonic idea where it was believed the eyes could 
penetrate the veil of mere appearances is no longer credible. We do not 
share the same impression or deduction about an individual, and within 
the realm of perception, a virtually infinite number of possibilities exists. 
Reality, it seems, has become an inexhaustible phenomenon where we can 
no longer trace its beginning or end. 
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STRATEGIES OF LIKENESS 
PAPER 2 
30 
To introduce Paper Two, I briefly refer to a recent photographic 
commission that identifies many of the issues addressed in the paper. 
I was employed to make a portrait of a woman, who would in turn give 
this portrait to her fiancee. I was surprised as my client was insistent that, as an 
artist-photographer, I should get to know something of her personality and 
armed with a verdict, I could reveal through the photograph her 'essence', her 
'truth'. 
It was with difficulty that I looked into the face before me, thinking and 
asking "Who is she? What is she? What is she to become?" This photograph 
was to be more than just a platitudinous record of her physiognomy. The image 
was to signify love, devotion and an impending marriage. 
The history of polliaiture of course preceded me; where it was claimed 
the eyes of the artist's genius could penetrate the veil of mere appearance and 
reveal the truth - the soul of the sitter. And yet, I could not escape Roland 
Barthes' identification in Camera Lucida, of the four image repertoires that 
oppose and distort one another, for in front of the camera as subject, you are at 
the same time: 
The one you think you are, the one you want others to think you are, the one the 
photographer thinks you are, and the one he - the photographer makes use of as his 
art.' 
The four image repertoires could not be denied, I was to become incalculably 
aware of the strategies that could be employed to reveal any number of her 
personality traits, or projected traits. The image would rely on my virtuoso 
skills as a photographic technician, and as a person who could project trust and 
an understanding for the needs of my client. But it was an image where there 
must remain a dislocation between what my client believed I could reveal and 
1 	Barthes, R Camera Lucida, Reflections on Photography (trans. Richard Howard) London, 1984; 
13. 
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what I would actually reveal, - an image that would hinge unequivocally on 
what she would be able to 'project' or would choose to 'project'. The final 
arbiter in these stratagems of 'surface' and 'show' would rely on the one image 
chosen from the multitude that would 'live' or 'die' under the scrutinizing 
glances of her lover. An image where the success or failure of the marriage 
might in the end contribute a yet unknown strategy to the final reading of the 
photographic portrait. 
This was to become the foundation on which this paper is based, but 
such was the diversity of the enquiry, it has evolved into two parts - A and B. 
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Part A identifies the invention of the photographic medium, in light of 
painters who asserted the camera was but a machine and recorded the mere 
surface of a thing - a debate that endeavoured to prove the painted portrait was 
infinitely more valuable than the photograph, as the painter had greater access 
to the divination of the soul of the sitter, and largely denied any intuitive 
flexibility of the camera operator. 
Part B challenges the validity of those artists who assert that the 
photograph can reveal the soul of the sitter. Supported by Camera Lucida and 
Barthes' four image repertoires, it shows there is no objective truth in the 
surface of a thing as every surface is contextually bound. 
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Part A 
It is generally acknowledged that the camera obscura paved the way for 
the development of photography. But an observation by Gisele Freund in 
Photography & Society is an interesting one and pre-empts some of the 
historical debates below. For Freund continues to perpetrate the myth that the 
painter has some divine intuitive power, over and above any machine that was 
tied by its automation. 
It was the invention of the physiognotrace, a device based on the 
pantograph, says Freund, that was the ideological predecessor of photography. 
'The physiognotrace was larger than the pantograph and was held upright so 
that the features of the sitter could be traced. Fitted with an eyepiece in place of 
a dry stylus, this device could transcribe the outlines of the face with near 
precision'. 
Freund speaks of the vulgarity of the physiognotrace as the pot 	uaits 
obtained were only of documentary value. 
They generally show the same flat, stylized, frozen expression,[that lacks expression 
because] it has not been executed with an artist's intuitive feeling for character. The 
works of miniaturists [painters] one can always see more than a simple likeness 
between model and copy for the artist is free to emphasise whatever characteristics he 
chooses, and thereby can evoke the spirit of the sitter as wel1. 2 
Freund observes, that only With the impersonal technique of photography was 
portraiture completely democratised. Freund's observation for the 
democratization of portraiture through photography is certainly validated, as in 
Paris alone it was said that in 1849, 100,000 daguerrotype portraits were taken 
- a modest figure if we consider a contemporary source which claimed in 1847 
half a million photographic plates were sold in Paris. However, Freund's 
2 	Freund, 0 Photography and Society (trans John Shepley) New York 1974; 18. 
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support for the artistic merits of the miniature portrait has little credibility when 
applied outside a limited number of remarkable images produced by painters of 
excellence. In fact the majority of miniatures were produced within an industry 
which suffered from restraints in having to provide a portrait that was both 
affordable and satisfied an established criteria of social decorum. Freund's 
support for the miniature is further ercided by the writing of both John Berger - 
The Moment of Cubism and Ernst Gombrich Art Perception and Reality - on 
which I will expand later. 
However, the traditional concerns with the camera obscura, a device 
employed by both figure and landscape artists as early as 1558, and other 
implements including the physiognotrace, certainly helped prepare the way for 
the acceptance of the photographic image and accommodated the growing 
conviction that it was to be the machine that was to be the final arbiter in the 
search for truth. 
Imagine both the delight and consternation in the publicised invention of 
photography in 1839, in England with Fox Talbot's calotype and with the 
daguerrotype in France. For today we could scarcely imagine the profundity of 
a device that enabled nature to register its own image. 
This was reflected in the names and terms coined to describe the new 
process. Camera images were called 'sun pictures' and were said to be 
'impressed by nature's hand'. Fox Talbot's illustrated book in 1844 - The 
Pencil of Nature perpetuated the idiom. 
Even the church became involved in an article that appeared in a German 
newspaper Leipziger Standtanzeiger in 1839. 
To try to capture fleeting mirror images is not only an impossible undertaking, as has 
been established after thorough German Investigation, the very wish to do such a thing 
is blasphemous. God has created man in his image and no human machine can capture 
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the image of God. He would have to betray all His Eternal Principles to allow a 
French man in Paris to unleash such a diabolical invention upon the world.3 
This article not only prophesied photography's impending utilization to 
promote todays consumerism, but also spoke of a certain pompous arrogance 
of the German church and nation. 
Western Europe prided itself on mechanical achievements; the 
simultaneous development of industry and technology, with an art which 
increasingly pushed towards an objective representation, coincided with the 
product of photography. Art was becoming inextricably bound to the 
philosophy of positivism and its faithful reproduction of an objective reality. 
As a result many people saw photography as a direct threat to art. 
However, numerous articles attempted to reassure artists there was little 
concern as the daguerrotypes were only in black and white and needed 
excessively long exposures (twenty minutes in full sunlight the earliest days of 
photography were not uncpmmon with devices invented like the appui-tete, 
where a metal brace attached to a chair held the skull securely from behind and 
remained hidden from the camera lens). 
As improvements in photographic techniques became available (as when 
exposure time was shortened to 4 to 5 minutes), the Art Union in 1841 assured 
artists 
They need not fear this innovation would injure them, for while a photographic 
portrait was inexorably faithful, none knew better than themselves how rarely a very 
close resemblance pleased the sitter.4 
However, this attitude was short-lived. By 1842 Richard Beard patented 
a method for applying colour to daguerrotypes. By 1846 reversing its earlier 
3 	Ibid.; 69. 
4 	Scharf, A Art and Photography Penguin 1968; 19. 
36 
position the Art Union praised Claudet's coloured daguerrotypes as truly and 
undoubtedly works of art. 5 
The poet Lamartine at first asserted that "photography was this chance 
invention which will never be art, but only a plagiarism of nature through the 
lens." However, he later changed his mind after seeing Adam Salomon's 
photographs. 
Disturbed by the charlatanism of those who dishonour photography by their countless 
copies, I had anathematized the art. The photo is the essence of photography. Once I 
have admired Adam Salomon's marvellous portraits taken in a burst of light, I can no 
longer call it a trade, it is an art_ It is more than art; it is a solar phenomenon in which 
the artist collaborates with the sun.6 
It was with the painting 'school' of Realism 1850-59 and with photography 
increasingly seeking affirmation for its own artistic pursuits, that we begin to 
see a clash in an enquiry as to the nature of art and reality, and its relationship 
to photography. Through these debates the adverse opinion of photography 
became known as well as the qualities that were said to prove that the painted 
pot trait was infinitely better than the photograph. 
The first realists believed in an impartiality of vision, to paint only what 
the eye sees, rejecting imagination as being non-objective. Gustave Courbet in 
protest to ideas maintained by the Academicians, stated his intent as "to paint 
only what the eye sees - to translate the customs, ideas, the aspects of my 
epoch according to my understanding." 7 
He, who did not paint an angel because he never saw one. 
5 	Ibid.; 20 
6 	op cit. Photography and Society ;77. 
7 	Colliers Encyclopedia Volume 18 of 24 volumes, Crowell-Collier Educational Corporation 1970; 
319. 
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Consequently Courbet's paintings and those of other realists were often 
equated with photographs and confirmed the opinion that photography and 
realism were the same thing. Courbees painting Return from the Fair exhibited 
1850-51 was described as t; 
a banal scene worthy only of the daguerrotype. 8 
This was further compounded by the fact that many artist's works were 
affected by photography, either indirectly through a growing familiarity with 
photographic images or directly through utilizing photographs as reference 
material. 
The criticism against the daguerrotype was the power of the photographic 
image in referring them to the 'thing itself. The camera was seen as an eye; an 
eye records and what is seen, is what is. The photographer was not seen as the 
mediator or author of the image, as both photography and the artist's hand 
were invisible. 
So the debate became twofold. 
On the one hand there were the academicians who felt photography and 
Realism were the same thing and photography had become a symbol of 
vulgarity - a weapon with which to slander the advocates of Realism. As a 
typical opinion expressed in 1856 by Henri Delorede showed, 
Photography gives us a brutal reality. By its own character it is the negation of the 
sentiment and the ideal. It produces sad effigies of human beings, without style and 
resulting today in what is called Realism. 9 
On the other hand the debate by the Realists was to show photography and 
Realism were not the same thing. 
8 	op cit. Art and Photography ; 96. 
9 	Ibid.; 97. 
38 
In the Realists' defence Champfleury took issue with the criticism that 
attracted the label 'daguerrotype'. 1° The daguerrotype was a machine he 
insisted; the artist is not or could not be. The reproduction of nature by man 
will never be a reproduction or an imitation, it will always be an interpretation' 
To prove this Champfleury proposed that if a landscape artist and a 
photographer were to make pictures of the same view, then each of the 
paintings would reflect the particular mood and temperament of the artist. 
Accordingly each would be different. The same could not be said for 
photography. Therefore "it is easy to affirm that man isn't a machine and 
cannot render objects like a machine." 11 
Proudhon in his book Concerning the Principles of Art and its Social 
Destiny further justies the merits of realism. 
If one thinks the aims of the artist is to reproduce the material appearance of things in 
imitation of nature, a copy, a forgery, it would be better that the artist abstain. Artistic 
expression is the excitement to a sensitivity resemblance, but requires as well the 
character, the thought, habits, and the passion of the subject: those things which art 
will give you better and more surely than the daguerrotype which can only seize a face 
instantaneously and consequently with the minimum of idealization. 
The portrait made by the artist in a series of sittings by long observation, gives one 
week, months, years of life to his subjects. A man is much better known through 
painting than through photography. 12 (my emphasis) 
To Proudhon and others like him, the portrait painters like Reynolds and 
Laurence who needed up to fifty sittings must have justified their ideological 
position. 
10 	Ibid.; 103. 
11 	Ibid.; 107. 
12 	Ibid.; 104. 
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The photographer was thought to be an acute, but non-interfering 
observer - a scribe but not a poet. But people quickly discovered that no two 
people take the same photograph of the same thing. The supposition that 
cameras created an impersonal objective record yielded to the fact that 
photographs are evidence not only of what is there but of what an individual 
sees, not just a record but an evaluation of the world. 
By 1859 the French Government conceded that photography was indeed 
an art and authorized yearly exhibitions to be held in the Palais de l'Industrie. It 
was in this year that Baudelaire was to reproach the smallmindedness of both 
public and artists alike who believed in the artistry of the photograph, and the 
realists with their obsessive love of nature. 
In these lamentable days a new industry has risen, which contributes not a little to 
confirming stupidity in its faith and to ruining what might have remained of the divine 
in the French genius....As far as painting and sculpture are concerned the current credo 
of the sophisticated public, above all in France...is this: "I believe in nature and I 
believe only in nature....I believe that art is and cannot be other than the exact 
reproduction of nature. Thus the industry that could give us a result identical with 
nature would be the absolute form of art. 
A vengeful God has granted the wishes of this multitude. Daguerre has been 
his messiah. And now the public says to itself: 
Since photography gives us all the quantities of exactitude that we wish (they believe 
the idiots) then photography and art are'the same thing." From that moment squalid 
society, like a single Narcissus, hurled itself upon the metal, to contemplate its trivial 
image....These new worshippers of the sun It must return to its real task, which is 
to be a servant of the sciences and of the arts , but the very humble servant, like 
painting and shorthand which have neither created nor supplanted literature. 13 
13 	Ibid.; 109 
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Baudelaire's anti-naturalistic position was the direct consequence of the 
emerging and powerful position that photography had assumed in the art 
world, further accentuated by its entrances into the Salon. Baudelaire's critique 
must be seen as an influential turning point in the development of painting. 
To conclude part one, I refer initially to the writings of John Berger and 
F. H. Gombich that essentially deny that the painted portrait revealed a 
psychological insight of the sitter. 
John Berger reinforces this premise in his article "The Changing View of 
Man and the Portrait". 
If we ignore the exceptional unprofessional portraits by Raphael, Rembrandt, Goya 
etc, the function of portrait painting was to underwrite and idealise a chosen social role 
of the sitter. It was not to present him as an 'individual' but rather as an individual 
monarch, bishop, landowner etc. Each role had its accepted qualities and its acceptable 
limit of discrepancy. "14 
E H Gombrich in "Art Perception and Reality" asks to what extent does the 
tradition of the painted portrait represent types or masks and how far are they 
individual likenesses? He sees the difficulty as lying in the fact that we are 
trapped by the mask and therefore find it hard to perceive the face. 
We have to make an effort to abstract from the wig to see how far these faces differ, 
and even then changing ideas of decorum and deportment , the social masks of 
expression make it hard for us to see the person as an individual. 15 
The premise on which to conclude Part A is twofold. 
Firstly, Berger and Gombrich recognise the history of portraiture is 
predominantly a gallery of poses, stiff in their social decorum and idealization. 
The myth that painters could reveal the soul of the sitter came as a direct 
14 	Berger, J 'The changing view of man in the Portrait' in The moment of Cubism and other essays 
London 1969 p. 
15 	Gombrich, E., Hochberg, J., and Black, M. Art, Perception and Reality London, 1972. 
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consequence of the photographic medium and the insecurity this elicited; a 
skilful marketing strategy that was perpetrated to oust its rival competitor. 
The second point hinges on the 'nature', the 'genius' of the photographic 
medium, where the photograph leads the mind to the actual world; if it is of a 
nude, we will think of women not art. Whilst photographers tried to deny the 
apparent objectivity of the medium and assert their objective as beingthe same 
as those of the painters, they were to deny what the second part of this paper, 
Part B, aims to argue; that no longer can a person be explained or understood 
from one point in time and there is little truth in the surface of a thing. 
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PART B 
In an age that once believed in Positivism in philosophy and Naturalism 
in art, with the photograph thought to be true to nature, it was once not 
unreasonable to think that some psychological truth may have been recognised 
in a person's bodily form. The speculations of Lavater (see Paper 1) on the 
subject of physiognomy must now however be considered speculative or 
absurd. 
Part B therefore shows that no longer can objectivity be a sure criterion 
of knowledge and that the camera machine, whilst it still asserts its apparent 
transparency, allows for every possible imaginary distortion. The photographic 
pot 	tiait hinges unequivocally on Barthes' four image repertoires: 
The one I think I am, the one I want others to think I am, the one the photographer 
thinks I am and the one the photographer makes use of as his art. 
I further qualify Barthes' fourth image repertoire as, the one that time, context 
and audience will ultimately determine. 
Such is the multiplicity of conflicting and divisive strategies at work 
within any portrait, that a viewer can never arrive at a conclusive understanding 
of who someone is. Therefore the soul/character of the sitter is an infinite 
equation of possibilities and a fabrication within the spectator's projected 
image. 
Whilst much of Part 2 of this paper is based on Roland Barthes' book Camera 
Lucida, that essentially denies the ability of photography to reveal the soul, I 
pre-empt Barthes with the quotes of four contemporary and well known 
photographers who, like the painters before them perpetuate the myth that they 
can reveal the 'essence' - the character - the soul of their sitter. Only Richard 
Avedon, the fifth quote cited, speaks candidly and with some regard for the 
exploitative potential of the photographic portrait. Avedon denies any intuitive 
divination of the sitter's character for Avedon's portrait is a self-portrait. 
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1. 1 have tried more and more to make photographs of people be biographies - to bring 
to light in each photograph the essential personality which is designated as 
temperament, soul, humanity. 16 (Kasebier) 
2. The most difficult thing for me is a portrait. It is not the same as photographing 
someone who is not conscious of being photographed. And the same thing happens 
when a biologist looks through his microscope; the thing studied does not react in the 
same way as it does when it is not being studied. And you must try to get your camera 
between the shirt and the skin of someone, which is not easy. The strange thing is 
that through your viewer you see people in their naked form. You are stealing 
something, and sometimes it can be very embarrassing. 17 (Bresson) 
3. Should I dominate in a subtle way; should I give myself up to 'luck', if such a 
thing exists, in that moment when my camera is ready and the person reveals  
himself(my underline), and seize the fraction of a second without any chance to change 
the result?....The greatest difficulty in photography lies in the necessary concurrence of 
the model's expression, the photographic performance and the quickness of the camera 
....But when the perfect spontaneous combination is achieved - a human document - 
the very essence of life is laid bare. 18 (Weston) 
4. The photographic portrait is an experience between the photographer and the 
subject. If I photographed you, I would observe every one of your aspects - the light of 
your cheek, the way your finger curves against your cheek, the lines on your forehead. 
Maybe when you were a little girl your mother looked at you with that intensity, but 
you have probably not been looked at with that intensity since then.. When 
photographers are good, they reveal people's secrets. 19 (Welpott) 
16 	Kasebier, G quoted by Ben Madow in Faces Boston 1977; 204. 
17 	Cartier Bresson, quoted in ibid.; 453. 
18 	Weston, E The Flame of Recognition (ed.by Nancy Newhall), London 1975; 37. 
19 	Jack Welpott, Faces; 469. 
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5. A portrait photographer depends upon another person to complete his picture. The 
subject imagined, which in a sense is me, must be discovered in someone else willing 
to take part in a fiction he cannot possibly know about. My concerns are not his. We 
have separate ambitions for the image. This need to plead his case probably goes as 
deep as my need to plead mine, but the control is with me. 
A portrait is not a likeness. The moment an emotion or a fact is transformed into a 
photograph it is no longer a fact but an opinion. There is no such thing as inaccuracy 
in a photograph. All photographs are accurate. None of them is truth. [my 
emphasis]2° (Avedon) 
Avedon comes closest to the very real poignancy of the photographic portrait 
and it hinges on those last sentences - 
There is no such thing as accuracy in a photograph. All photographs are accurate. 
None of them is truth. 
Avedon does not propose that his portraits reveal the soul and the character of 
the person, for his portraits are an opinion, where one surface has been elicited 
by the photographer and manipulated for his own ends. 
Roland Barthes identifies in Camera Lucida the mimicry between his 
profound self and his effigy as created by the camera. For Barthes denies 
Gertrude Kasebier's belief (cited above) of "revealing the essential 
personality" of the sitter, or Cartier Bresson's ability to "get beneath the shirt 
and the skin of a person". The social game of posing must in no way alter "the 
precious essence of my individuality", writes Barthes: 
What I am apart from my effigy. What I want in short is that my mobile image, 
buffeted among a thousand shifting photographs, altering with situation and with age, 
should always coincide with my (profound) self; but it is the contrary that must be 
said: 'myself never coincides with my image, for it is the image which is heavy, 
motionless, stubborn (which is why society sustains it) and myself which is light, 
20 	Avedon, R In the American West London 1985. 
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divided, dispersed....lf only photography could give me a neutral, anatomic body, a 
body which signifies nothing! Alas I am doomed by (well-meaning) photography 
always to have an expression; my body never finds its zero degree.21  
Barthes identifies two things in this quotation. The first is that no 'still'- 
photographic image (and it might be speculated that no image, painted, 
photographic or filmic), could equate with Barthes' profound self -(a 
problematic and unarguable point). 
However, the second point has more scope for enquiry, as Barthes 
believes the expression captured by the camera never reaches its zero degree. 
Barthes however, contradicts himself as he later says: 
For what society makes of my photo, what it reads there I do not know (in any case 
there are so many readings of the same face).22 
I pursue the point further by first referring to facial expression, where the 
ambiguity of the arrested face draws from a multiplicity of possible readings in 
real life; where it can be seen a tenuous link exists between what the face 
actually expressed and what it appears to express. 
The most famous example is of course Leonardo's painting of the Mona 
Lisa., whose smile has been the subject of many fanciful interpretations. It is 
said to "stir up repressed desires - mocks you with her smile - a painting said to 
have survived because of its mystique, subtlety, and aura of indefinability" 23 
The Mona Lisa draws from life where expressive movements are 
movements and once we lack the explanatory sequence to determine from 
where this configuration started and where it leads, the ambiguity can increase 
to an unexpected extent. This can equally be seen in the contorted face of a 
wrestler that may look in isolation like an expression of laughter, while a man 
21 	op cit.; Barthes; 12. 
22 	Ibid.; 14 
23 	Boas, G Wingless Pegasus. a handbook for critics Baltimore 1950; 4 -26. 
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opening his mouth to eat may appear to be yawning. Laughter it is said, is 
close to tears, and there may be some doubt about whether a person is weeping 
or amused. 
Samuel Fernberger, a modern psychologist, claims that it is impossible 
ever to diagnose emotion from the facial and body expression alone unless 
given a clue from the situation and context from which it arises. 
Within the history of portrait painting the stock formalisation of culturally 
• determined expressions predominate in the ritualised gestures of prayer or 
greeting, represented in early Renaissance painting. Expressions of both the 
body and facial expressions were clearly limited in an effort to be conceptually 
clear and unambiguous. 
Charles Darwin in Expression in Man and Animals (who claimed to show that 
our ways of expressing feeling and emotion have an evolutionary origin), 
hoped to gain much from the great masters in painting and sculpture and said 
"but with a few exceptions (one) has not thus profit. The reason no doubt is 
that, in works of art, beauty is the chief object and strongly contracted facial 
muscles destroy beauty. “24 
Whilst on the one hand I speak of the ambiguity of expression, there are 
a limited number of expressions that are replete with signs and photography, 
like painting before it, uses these to great effect. 
I refer in particular to the political poster, but it must be made very clear, 
that the expressive devices tap into culturally current and meaningful codes of 
communication and we realise in fact, we know nothing of the person depicted 
other than that which the political machine wants us to know. In addition, the 
apparent transparency of the photograph contributes an inestimable strategy in 
the whole procedure. 
24 	Darwin, C The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals Chicago 1965; 14. 
47 
I refer initially to the photograph of Winston Churchill (see figure 1) 
where the proliferation of this one photograph taken by Yosef Karsh has 
become synonomous with not only the physiognomic identity of Churchill but 
his personality as well. 
Fig.l. Winston Churchill, photographed by Karsh, Ottawa. 
We are told by Karsh how unwilling Churchill was in 1941 to pose for the 
photograph and how he allowed only two minutes as he passed from the 
chamber to the anteroom. As Churchill approached with a scowl, Karsh 
snatched the cigar from his mouth and made him rather angry. However, as 
indicated, that expression we now equate with Churchill was no more than a 
passing reaction to a trivial incident and yet, was perfectly suited to symbolize 
the leader's defiance of the enemy. 
(Yosef Karsh - Portraits of Greatness, Edinburgh 1959). 
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Roland Barthes in - "Photography and Electoral Appeal" (briefly referred 
to in Paper One) does in addition refer to the expressive strategies that have 
been used in political posters. 
A full face photograph underlines the realistic outlook of its candidate, especially if he 
is provided with scrutinizing glasses. Everything there expresses - penetration, gravity, 
frankness: the future deputy is looking squarely at the enemy....A three quarter face 
photograph, which is more common, suggests the tyranny of an ideal: Its gaze is lost 
nobly in the future, it does not confront, it soars and fertilizes some other 
domain....An almost three quarter photo is ascensional, the face lifted towards a 
supernatural light which draws it up and elevates it to the realm of a higher 
humanity.25 
Having said this, I refer back momentarily to the enigmatic smile of the Mona 
Lisa, the way she seems to smile with only the left part of her mouth. Maybe 
the apparent ambiguity of the expression may have after all agreed with a piece 
of advice given to Renaissance women by Agnolo Firenzulo in a book on 
beauty, where he suggested, 
From time to time close the mouth at the right corner with a suave and subtle 
movement, and to open it at the left side, as if you were smiling secretly...this is not 
affectation, if it is done in a restrained and graceful manner and accompanied by 
innocent coquetry and by certain movements of the eyes..26 
An expression once learned and utilized in life, one might imply, becomes as 
equally puzzling and intriguing as the smile of the Mona Lisa. Given this it is 
interesting to speculate whether the enigmatic smile was a particular mannerism 
indicative of the Mona Lisa, or learned, as Firenzulo's quotation may indicate; 
or merely a painting technique utilized by Da Vinci; - a technique where to paint 
slightly contradictory expressions in an effort to animate a portrait was, by the 
25 	Barthes, R Mythologies (trans by Annette Lavers) London, 1972; 93. 
26 	Devane, J Drawing and Painting The Portrait_New York 1983; 19. 
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18th century, to fall into a crass and familiar formula. The possible scenarios 
that a single expression can evoke are limited only by the context in which they 
are seen. 
As Susan Sontag in On Photography ,1977 asserts only that which 
narrates can make us understand and as this function takes place in time, it 
must be explained in time.27 
And yet such is the apparent transparency of photography as the unmediated 
copy, or the mechanical transcription that the facts as it were are infinitely 
mutable by theory or point of view. Once given a point of view by context or 
audience, they are convincing as anonymous and authoritative evidence, (the 
same premise with which the historical debate tried to come to terms at the time 
of photography's invention, to ascertain if photography was in fact art). 
As the photographic example of Robert Doisneau's portrait of a man and 
a woman drinking in a Paris cafe shows, (see Fig 2) the meaning of any 
photograph is dependent on the context in which it appears. As this photograph 
was published in four different contexts, radically affecting the ways in which 
it was interpreted. 
Fig.2. , Robert Doisneau, At the Cafe, Chez Fraysse, Rue de Seine,  
Paris, 1958. 
27 	Sontag, S On Photography New York 1977; 108. 
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The first was part of a photographic essay on Paris cafes in a mass 
circulation magazine, Le Point. Sometime later, without Doisneau's consent it 
appeared in a brochure on the evils of alcohol published by a temperance 
league. Later still, and again without Doisneau's consent, it appeared in a 
French scandal sheet with the caption 'Prostitution in the Champs Elysees'. 
This provoked a court case in which the man in the photograph sought and was 
awarded damages and compensation. The fourth context in which it occured 
was in the Museum of Modern Art in New York, Szarkowski offering the 
interpretation of "secret venial sins of ordinary individuals - a potential 
seduction."28 
The point becomes particularly poignant when referring to photographic works 
seen on museum and gallery walls. Often the only information accompanying 
the work is the photographer's name, the date of the photograph; with the 
words Untitled or an equally innocuous title, like - Man with a stick. For it is 
precisely because of the lack of context and the infinite possibilities of readings 
this allows, that many photographers continue to utilize this strategy. 
Pursuing this point, through the photographs Richard Avedon took of his 
father consolidates many of the points addressed so far. Avedon's portraits are 
conceived and exhibited as art with virtually no title or caption, that essentially 
diffuse or deny the personality of its sitter, for the subject is a pawn in 
Avedon's quest for self expression. 
Avedon was to write about the six photographs of his father who was dying of 
cancer: 
Whenever he poses for me he smiles and becomes benign, gentle,. .. somehow wise. 
He's interested in looking sage. My photographs show his impatience. 29 
(Avedon's aim is to photograph people as they never see themselves.) 
28 	Barrett, Terry in Journal of Aesthetic Education:Vol. 19, No. 3, fall 1985; 52. 
29 	Rosenberg, H Portraits/Richard Avedon New York 1976. 
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What do these six photographs of Avedon Senior show the author of this 
paper? 
On the one hand, they depict the imminent death of an old man wasting away 
through either age or sickness (for we are not told of the cancer except by 
associated texts). They are powerful not because we feel we know Jacob Isral 
Avedon but because it shows what someone looks like as they are about to die; 
it is horribly prophetic as we anticipate our own death. 
But they also speak of device - the white backdrop, the cumbersome 
camera, a technique that allows for little candour, the emptying out of 
biographical props. It is a portrait that says stand here whilst I make a portrait. 
Don't smile, look here - look into the camera. 
It is a portrait that has reached Barthes' zero degree, not by the devices of 
capturing a flickering expression but by a non-expression - a face that is a 
product of nature, environment, age, and an impending death. 
Offered as art, little or no information accompanies these pictures. They 
live within a field of potential where I know audience, context and time will 
irrevocably play their part. It's as if the photograph has become the stage - the 
cinematic screen where the actors have become the audience and their 
performance is any number of visions projected onto the neutral image. 
A further quirk or twist is that these images are said to testify to the 
greatness of an artist who could offer his father to the world. When asked, 
"What kind of a man could take such pictures?" Avedon responded that the 
photographs did not represent his father, but what it is to be any one of US.3° 
As is demonstrated, captions and contexts have a persuasive effect on 
what is seen in a picture. By altering the context in which it is shown, or by 
adding text, the same photograph can support very different points of view, or 
even contradictory readings. So powerful is the power of the caption in 
30 	Ibid 
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determining the reading, it gives a somewhat different perspective to the old 
dictum - pictures speak louder than words - for words and context can very 
well speak louder than pictures. 
It is at this point I return to Barthes and the second part of Camera 
Lucida, where all that has been said appears to be undermined by one 
photograph that was to Barthes to reveal the very essence - the soul of his 
mother. Whilst Barthes reiterates something of Part A and the genius of the 
photographic medium, he established an ideological position which cannot be 
contradicted for it is linked unqualifiably to a private history. 
Barthes is well aware of the fiction of the photograph as he says photography 
is not truth because it can lie about the meaning of a thing, but he identifies 
something more: that it cannot lie about the subject's existence. 
The photograph is literally an emanation of its referent; from the real body which was 
there, proceed radiations which ultimately touch me who am here.31 
Both Susan Sontag On Photography and Rosalind Krauss "Photographic 
Conditions of Realism" speak of this phenomenon. But for Barthes it becomes 
lacerating in its madness, a condition perpetuated by love and loss. Searching 
among photographs after his mother's death" struggling", says Barthes, 
"between images partly true and therefore totally false," 32 he then found her in 
this one photograph, Winter Garden. His mother was five and her brother 
seven. He writes that "it achieved for me utopically the impossible essence of 
the unique being.33 
For here photography and only photography was to lay bare an essential 
essence of his mother as Barthes wanted to remember her and yet an image that 
was far removed from any of Barthes' lived experience. 
31 	op cit. Camera Lucidai 80. 
32 	Ibid.; 66. 
33 	Ibid.; 77. 
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Barthes identifies the essence (for we can no longer speak of truth) as 
belonging to two genres - one of gesture and the other as the name of 
photography - 'that-which-has-been'.  
Firstly to gesture: 
The distinctness of her face, the naive attitude of her hands, the place she had docilely 
taken without either showing or hiding herself and finally her expression, which 
distinguished her, like Good from Evil,...the figure of sovereign innocence, all this 
had transformed the photo pose into that untenable paradox which she maintained all 
her life; the assertion of a gentleness. 34 
And secondly every photograph is somehow co-natural with its referent. 
I can never deny that the thing has been there ., there is a superimposition here; of 
reality and of the past. And since this only exists for photography, we must consider it 
by reduction as the very essence, the name of photography.35 
All the photographs of my mother which I was looking through were a little like so 
many masks; at the last, suddenly the mask vanished: there remained a soul, ageless 
but not timeless.36 
I passed beyond the unreality of the thing represented, I entered crazily into the 
spectacle into the image, taking into my arms what is dead, what is going to die. 37 
Whilst Barthes speaks of love and the crippling effects of loss that hinge 
painfully on a single distant photograph, Barthes identifies this chasm between 
the private and the public photograph. 
Barthes' picture is 'tenuously' linked to a private history, a context - a 
memory. It is tenuous because it is a picture that describes the physiology and 
an expression of a young five year old girl - a little girl Barthes could never 
34 	Ibid.; 69. 
35 	Ibid.; 76-.77. 
36 	Ibid.; 109. 
37 	Ibid.; 117. 
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have known and yet was in the photograph to contain the very essence of her 
being. 
It is unknown face excepting the speculative claim that might concern the 
'aria', that shadow, that genesis of what she was to become. The Winter 
Garden photograph remains difficult and yet is securely placed within a private 
history. 
Why did Barthes never give the reader of Camera Lucida the Winter 
Garden photograph, where, as a viewer, one could search for the truth of this 
one image amongst the untruth of the others? Because it would have been a 
pointless enquiry. 
It exists only for me. For you it would be nothing but an indifferent picture, one of 
the thousand manifestations of the 'ordinary'...at most it would only interest your 
studium; period clothes, photogeny; but in it, for you, no wound. 38 
Doisneau speaks of the depth of a photograph as dependent on the 
perceptiveness of the viewer - the beholder's share; and as we have seen Paris 
Cafe was a photograph that was equally powerful in its ability to support four 
different contexts. 
The poignancy of Doisneau's words speak very clearly, given the earlier 
example of Paris Cafe - 
The person who looks at the photograph must be allowed to travel that visual trail. 
We must always keep in mind that a photograph is also made by the person who is 
looking at it...speaking of the path that one undertakes when experimenting with 
photography. We must let the spectator untangle himself and be liberated for the 
journey. The seed is offered and the spectator lets it grow inside himself. For a long 
time I thought I should tell my public the whole tale. I was mistaken.39 
(my emphasis) 
381 	Ibid.; 72. 
39 	Schnaith, N `Looking Into Another Look in Photovision 3, 1981; 58. 
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39 	Schnaith, N Looking Into Another Look' in Photovision 3, 1981; 58. 
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In conclusion, all human expressions captured by the camera, have a 
multiplicity of meanings that go beyond the explicit meaning of either the sitter 
or the portraitist. For the photograph lives or can live in a field of potentiality. 
The portrait is not only what the photographer wants to detect and what he 
detects without knowing it, it is what the model wants to show, and show 
without knowing it. It is also what the spectator sees without necessarily 
suspecting it, it is what context and art will ultimately make of it. The camera 
shutter severs the connection, ends one experience and begins another. 
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